Creative Accounting: Consumer culture, the ‘creative economy’ and the cultural policies of New Labour’ by Littler, J.
Littler, J. (2000). Creative Accounting: Consumer culture, the ‘creative economy’ and the cultural 
policies of New Labour’. In: J. Gilbert & T. Bewes (Eds.), Cultural Capitalism: Politics after New 
Labour. (pp. 203-222). London: Lawrence & Wishart. ISBN 9780853159179 
City Research Online
Original citation: Littler, J. (2000). Creative Accounting: Consumer culture, the ‘creative economy’ 
and the cultural policies of New Labour’. In: J. Gilbert & T. Bewes (Eds.), Cultural Capitalism: 
Politics after New Labour. (pp. 203-222). London: Lawrence & Wishart. ISBN 9780853159179 
Permanent City Research Online URL: http://openaccess.city.ac.uk/6027/
 
Copyright & reuse
City University London has developed City Research Online so that its users may access the 
research outputs of City University London's staff. Copyright © and Moral Rights for this paper are 
retained by the individual author(s) and/ or other copyright holders.  All material in City Research 
Online is checked for eligibility for copyright before being made available in the live archive. URLs 
from City Research Online may be freely distributed and linked to from other web pages. 
Versions of research
The version in City Research Online may differ from the final published version. Users are advised 
to check the Permanent City Research Online URL above for the status of the paper.
Enquiries
If you have any enquiries about any aspect of City Research Online, or if you wish to make contact 
with the author(s) of this paper, please email the team at publications@city.ac.uk.
 1 
Creative Accounting: Consumer Culture, the ‘Creative Economy’ 
and the Cultural Policies of New Labour 
Jo Littler 
 
In Tim Bewes and Jeremy Gilbert (eds) Cultural Capitalism: Politics after New Labour 
(L&W, 2000)  
 
 
In Stephen Bayley’s book Labour Camp: The Failure of Style Over Substance, the former 
creative director of the New Millennium Experience shares his views on New Labour’s 
cultural policies and practices.  As the title suggests, Bayley’s opinion is not exactly 
favourable; and this in itself is not particularly surprising, given Bayley’s dramatic resignation 
as creative director of the Dome and the general reputation of the ‘style guru’ for designer 
tantrums and waspish comment.  What Labour Camp does, firstly, is to argue, through 
anecdote and invective, that from Cool Britannia to Lord Irvine’s wallpaper, from the Dome 
to the ‘branding Britain’ debates, New Labour manifests the triumph of ‘style’ over 
‘substance’, has offered a cultural regime consumed by the superficial aspects of image. 
Moreover, this is not just any old ‘shallow’ image either, but an exceptionally dull and 
debased one: the second charge of the book is that cultural standards are being lowered. As 
proof, Bayley shudders, we now have in charge of the Arts Council former Granada chairman 
Gerry Robinson, the ‘caterer to Nescafé society’.
i
  
 
Bayley’s account is structured by the belief that design or art or should not be ‘political’ and 
that it can somehow exist in a zone ‘outside’ politics.  Similarly, the critique rests (somewhat 
incongruously, coming from the former director of the Design Museum) on the idea of ‘style’ 
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and ‘substance’ as mutually exclusive entities, on the idea of a binary opposition between 
‘image’ and ‘reality’.  Consequently, the title Labour Camp figures in the text as if it were an 
obvious enough insult in itself, and the verdict of a ‘shallow’ style is formulated through a 
thinly-veiled homophobia, directed in particular towards Peter Mandelson and Chris Smith.  
 
Why should the account of a residually Thatcherite critic and the theoretically moribund 
usage of ‘style’ and ‘substance’ as mutually exclusive entities be of interest here?  I would 
suggest that the terms employed in Labour Camp are worth noting precisely because of their 
familiarity, because of the extent to which such commentaries on Labour’s cultural policies 
had, by 1998 if not earlier, become hegemonic within certain sections of the media.  In this 
respect, the book was echoing, as well as eliciting, many other media reports about Labour’s 
concern with ‘style’ over ‘substance’.
ii
   
 
Let us take another example which focuses on the cultural policies and discourses being 
promoted by New Labour.  In an extended feature article in Guardian Weekend  in November 
1998, similar terms were differently mobilised by Jonathan Glancey, who bemoaned the 
current state of ‘dumbed-down’ British culture, arguing that it merely offered a watered-down 
culture packaged in the wrapping of free enterprise.  This has been caused, he argued, 
primarily by well-educated, well-meaning liberals who have unwittingly betrayed the 
populace.  Their pursuit of ‘democratic’ art has necessarily produced a populist culture in 
which second-rate art is encouraged at the expense of that of which could have been great.
iii
  
 
What both these arguments have in common is not only a shared distaste for Labour’s cultural 
policies, but an identification of the fact that the cultural policies introduced since the 
government came into office in 1997 have consistently articulated and promoted a connection 
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between ‘culture’ and ‘industry’.  Whilst it is easy to sympathise with the issues that prompt 
Glancey’s critique, the danger in this article is similar to that in Labour Camp, namely the 
tendency to throw out the notion of democratic art, to revive that idea of ‘the great’, and to 
mix these discourses with one recommending expanded access.  To look at this from another 
angle, both accounts, whilst pinpointing that something is rotten in the cultural state of 
Labour, are problematic precisely because of the way they interpret this newly manifested 
connection between discourses of ‘consumerism’ and the ‘culture’ which causes them so 
much displeasure. 
 
Historically, the intersection between ‘culture’ and ‘industry’ has been a theoretical space in 
which distinctly undemocratic prejudices have crept in, often unannounced (‘high culture’ 
was a phenomenon constructed not only through an opposition to mass culture and 
consumption, but to their synonyms, the lower-class and the feminine) and this is certainly the 
case here, in Bayley’s snobbery about ‘Nescafé society’ and Glancey’s return to ‘the great’.
iv
  
The issue therefore becomes how to understand and find a suitable language in which to 
identify New Labour’s cultural policies without collapsing into the pitfalls of either idealising 
‘culture’ as a space separate from the rest of the social world or, conversely, of celebrating 
any linkage between culture and industry as necessarily emancipatory by virtue of cultural 
diffusion, a position only too compatible with neo-liberal economics.  It is helpful, I suggest, 
to locate an analysis of this particular conjunction between culture and industry in relation to 
an understanding of the history of British cultural policy and the politics of discourses of 
consumerism.  To these ends, this chapter will look at policies on culture alongside the more 
diffusive, discursive effects of New Labour’s allegiances.  
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Culture, Society and the State 
To analyse the relationship between cultural policy and commerce under New Labour it is 
instructive to return to and reassess some of the  ways in which the relationship between 
culture, cultural policy and commerce has been historicised and theorised by the left.  As 
Raymond Williams demonstrated so persuasively and eloquently all those years ago in 
Culture and Society, the separation off of ‘culture’ as a relatively autonomous space can be 
historically located in the transformations of industrial modernity.  The construction of a 
sphere which was formulated as beyond the material, political, social and economic, emerged 
as part and parcel of a system of industrialised labour organised around the pursuit of capital.  
The meaning of culture changed from the tending of crops, animals and, by extension, people, 
to become an independent noun meaning a system of objects and attitudes which were 
cordoned off from, and which were thought of as transcending society.  Infused in Romantic 
thought, packaged through individuated authorship, ‘Culture’ gradually came to function as 
both a sanitising disclaimer of this system and as a marketable product unto ‘itself’.
v
 
 
In their recent book Culture and the State, David Lloyd and Paul Thomas revisit Culture and 
Society.  Like many other recent commentaries they argue that Williams’s work contains a 
strain of romanticism, noting that in his writing what ‘remains as a powerful presence is a 
vestigial conception of culture representing the possibility of ‘the whole man’ against the 
division of labour’.
vi
  They argue that in his idea of culture as ‘a whole way of life’, Williams 
retains the idea of culture as a possibly utopian site but wants to give this a socialist 
inflection; that he implicitly pursues a project of ‘saving culture by making it socialist’.
vii
 
 
This text is not alone in locating a streak of Romanticism in Williams’s work.
viii
  Where it 
differs from some other critical re-evaluations, however, is that its outcome is neither the 
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recommendation of positivist empirical scrutiny as  the only legitimate mode of cultural 
analysis (the idea that ‘truth’ can be found in the details), nor the wholesale dismissal of 
Williams.  Rather, acknowledging its own relationship to the founding text, it sympathetically 
traces and critiques Williams’s conceptual trajectories and suggests that his schema can be re-
theorised by drawing from Gramscian and post-structuralist theory as well as from occluded 
Chartist narratives.  I want to summarise their analysis here, as it provides a useful frame for 
understanding Labour’s cultural policies and affiliations, as well as providing suggestions for 
a more progressive politics.  
 
Lloyd and Thomas emphasise that not only was culture established to compensate and 
function as a substitution for the alienation of labour, but that ‘aesthetic culture becomes the 
ground or condition of possibility both for thinking and forging the human subject’.
ix
  They 
suggest that the notion of ‘culture’ was developed not in opposition to society so much as to 
provide the principle through which individuals became citizens for the state.
x
  To some 
extent this echoes – as well as Williams’s and E.P. Thompson’s work – Foucauldian-inflected 
commentaries which have astutely elaborated upon how ‘culture’ was deployed throughout 
the nineteenth century as a mechanism for dispelling ‘anarchy’ (to use Matthew Arnold’s 
terms) and disseminated through a range of institutions and practices to induce the formation 
of a civil and docile populace.
xi
  (To take but one frequently cited example, a key reason why 
London’s National Gallery was built in Trafalgar Square was because it was a popular site for 
public demonstrations – it was explicitly hoped that the gallery would have ‘a softening 
effect’.
xii
)  But where Lloyd and Thomas offer a new and useful perspective is to link this 
usage of ‘culture’ to the politicality of the modern state.  Highlighting how the process by 
which aesthetic culture became separated as a distinct sphere paralleled the rise of 
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representative democracy, they argue that culture and the modern state are coeval: that they 
bring each other’s terms into being. 
 
Foregrounding the extent to which having a representative system – that is, having someone 
to speak for a constituency – was resisted and eloquently argued against, of how it ‘was not 
easy to gain acceptance for the notion that being represented was the normative mode of one’s 
relation to political life’,
xiii
 Culture and the State argues that the ‘representative’ mode came to 
shape both cultural institutions and aesthetic ideals.  This discourse around ‘culture’ provided 
the terms of what being a citizen and being a state meant.  As the state came to mean ‘the best 
self’ rather than a conjoined whole, so too ‘the function of culture’ became ‘to cultivate the 
identity between the ideal or ethical man in every object and the state which is its 
representative’.
xiv
  This ideology of being represented was therefore echoed and facilitated by 
an expanded and idealised notion of culture; and likewise by cultural institutions which were 
becoming increasingly ‘sectioned-off’ from other processes and realms, particularly that of 
work. 
 
For instance, examples of the former include how the poet becomes a representative of all 
men, speaking to rather than amongst them; and how schools became a mode in which a 
teacher, representing the state and knowledge, imparted wisdom unto their pupils.
xv
 And as 
culture became a space which functioned to educe a citizen from a human being, it could of 
course be used as a space in which in which a struggle towards an endlessly deferred process 
of becoming ‘fully human’ could take place.  In this way, culture as a separate sphere was 
explicitly used as the basis to delay further enfranchisement.  Whereas the (proto-Gramscian) 
Chartist position argued that working produced relevant knowledge, the classic Victorian 
liberal position argued that disinterested education must precede the vote.
xvi
  Education in this 
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formulation explicitly meant distance from labour.  The sectioning out of spheres was, 
therefore, crucial in dismantling the opposition to mutual democratic forms of cultural 
politics, and in particular, Lloyd and Thomas argue that the extent of the struggle over this 
terrain, and the degree of critical consciousness of this by the Chartists and others, has been 
totally obscured.
xvii
 
 
I cite Culture and the State at length here for two reasons.  Firstly, its account is important 
because it exhaustively demolishes any remaining strands of credibility for the still 
entrenched idea that ‘culture’ can function as a utopian space outside of, or acting as 
consolation for, social conditions.  The left has a long history of investing in a notion of that 
reified by-product of industrial capitalism, high culture.  As Alan Sinfield, terming this 
phenomenon ‘left-culturism’, puts it, ‘the idea that culture transcends material conditions has 
a strong socialist lineage’.
xviii
  Culture and the State implicitly poses as its alternative a range 
of sites which offer mutual, democratic participation beyond that of the representative model 
– not a theoretical model which is new on the left, but one whose legacy in terms of recent 
cultural policy has tended to become obscured.
xix
  Secondly, its focus on the politics of the 
relationship between governments, cultural institutions and the uses of ‘culture’ provides us 
with both a historical perspective with which to think through New Labour’s cultural policies 
and with a political frame with which to trace their connections to previous governmental 
formulations of culture.  If we look at Creative Britain, the 1998 collection of official 
speeches and pieces by the Minister for Culture Chris Smith, for example, a glaringly obvious 
and pervasive motif which remains, alongside the (sporadic) strategies for ‘inclusion’, is that 
‘culture’ is in many ways fundamentally a separate sphere. 
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Private lives 
Creative Britain has a clear investment, and I use the term deliberately, in the notion of 
‘culture’ as a realm of individualised creativity. We are told that ‘individual creativity is 
where it starts’; and the notion of culture which is being mobilised clearly owes a great deal to 
a Romantic notion of high culture, with Smith informing us that it can ‘lead us into a deeper 
world than that which exists on the surface’.
xx
  The extent of the stake in this notion is 
apparent even as he is exhorting us to embrace what might previously have been described as 
‘low’ cultural forms: 
 
The deepest cultural experiences will frequently come, for all of us, from the heights of 
fine opera or the sweeping sounds of a classical orchestra or the emotional torment of 
high drama. But we shouldn’t ignore the rest of cultural activity at the same time.
xxi
 
 
The assumption here is clearly that the aesthetic of the sublime, of a romantic excess of 
feeling, is what fundamentally counts, and this is why he is trying hard not to ignore other 
cultural models (for which read ‘the low’).  The most important type of ‘culture’ functions as 
the ‘fully human’, a utopian site, a space for experiencing ‘deep’ emotions, to be encountered 
individually. In this respect, the separation of culture as a realm unto itself, the notion which 
emerged from liberal modernity and the gradual introduction of representative democracy, is 
still firmly in place.  
 
But at the same time, this discourse has been accompanied by a multitude of actions which 
clearly do not mark the entrenchment of a notion of ‘culture’ as a separate sphere.  To start 
with, Labour’s renaming the Department of Heritage the Department of ‘Culture, Media and 
Sport’ (DCMS) and the concomitant widening of its remit necessarily involved an expansion 
of the meaning of ‘culture’ deployed by the government.  Drawn further away from a notion 
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of ‘heritage’, which was often regarded as reactionary, anachronistic and nostalgic 
(particularly, but not exclusively, by critics on the left), the Department now encompasses a 
far broader field, one in which for the first time culture is brought ‘down’ to the same 
discursive level as sport and the media..  
 
Secondly, there has been the encouragement of areas which would once have been regarded 
as ‘low’ culture, despite Smith’s occasional need to cordon off particular areas with the velvet 
rope of true cultural worth: Creative Britain is stacked with references to popular music, 
cinema and design.  Certainly, the fact that the distinctions between ‘high’ and ‘low’ culture 
have collapsed or are collapsing does not go unnoticed.  High and low cultural forms are to be 
linked, however, through the idea that they should be disseminated and conjoined with 
industry.  
 
The value accorded to the individual and to individualism is a central motif of Creative 
Britain and of policies like NESTA, the National Endowment for Science, Technology and 
the Arts.  This was primarily conceived to ‘help talented individuals develop their full 
potential’; secondly to ‘turn creativity into products and services which we can exploit in the 
global market’; and thirdly to convince the public and business of this agenda.
xxii
  The key 
link being made is between individualised creativity and the market: 
 
The Creative Industries as a whole are big business. They are the fields in which jobs 
have been created and will be created, into the next century. And they all depend 
ultimately in the talent of an individual or the intellectual property that is created in 
order to succeed.  That is why I welcome all moves to increase exchanges between the 
cultural and business world.
xxiii
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What this rhetoric does is retain the ideology of high culture in the sense of individualised 
creativity and genius, and to disseminate this into an increasingly expansive cultural field – 
one which now includes ‘high’ and ‘low’ culture – with the primary aim of financial profit. 
We might say that the ideology of the ‘separate spheres’ as discussed in Culture and the State 
is present qualitatively, in that 'culture' is still an individually nurtured or private quality 
which is created in a space distinct from the rest of social life.    
 
And so the entrepreneurial creative subject addressed by Creative Britain is a descendent of 
Enlightenment man who pursues his private self-defined interests, autonomously constructs 
his own identity and products, and to whom the State’s rightful role is one of facilitation.
xxiv
  
In its current form, it is part of a larger project: Sylvia Bashevkin has identified as a key third 
way theme the increasing role of political leaders to operate as facilitators between individuals 
and corporations, in which individuals are encouraged to take what corporations offer.  She 
adds that it is a project which goes hand in hand with the treatment of NGOs as less important 
than business-achieving individuals, and an increasing moral agenda of personal 
responsibility.
xxv
  Similarly, in Creative Britain – while ‘social inclusion’ is nominally on the 
agenda, and social regeneration gets an occasional mention – the primary term is 
individualism, either backed up by, or as a means of achieving, economic growth. 
 
Entrepreneurial legacies  
We can understand more about this cultural policy discourse by locating it in the history of 
post-war cultural provision, in relation to what Jim McGuigan has termed the slow movement 
from traditional social democratic arts funding to one based around ‘economistic’ 
principles.
xxvi
  I want to discuss this by focusing on how other historical models have 
negotiated the conjunction between commerce and culture.  
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Creative Britain, as already mentioned, relentlessly pushes to centre stage the relationship 
between culture and industry. Whether discussing art galleries, music, heritage sites or 
contemporary films, Smith has continually been at pains to point out the economic benefits of 
the arts, of the financial profitability of culture. ‘[W]e have recognized’ he states at the 
beginning of the book, ‘the importance of this whole new industrial sector that no-one 
hitherto has even conceived of as an industry’.
xxvii
  However, this fashioning of areas in ‘the 
arts’ as industries is however deeply indebted to, on the one hand, Thatcherism – prior to 
which mentioning the arts and money in a shared cultural breath was by and large anathema – 
and on the other, left models of cultural provision, most significantly developed in the 
practice of the Greater London Council during the 1980s.  
 
Thatcherism attempted to fashion state arts bodies in the image of corporate business practice.  
The previous ‘gentlemanly’ agreements of cross-party appointments were by and large 
abolished; the lines of privilege and institutions previously dominated by the ‘snobbocracy’ 
(the Old-Boy white aristocratic network) were infiltrated and snipped by the entrepreneurial 
New Boys (the white, self-made businessman network).  Cuts in state subsidies, demands for 
accountability and efficiency savings, and the refashioning of institutions in managerial terms 
were accompanied by a welter of attempts to encourage business sponsorship in the arts.  The 
extensive use of public money to privilege and support the private sector took place through 
such mechanisms as Office of Arts and Libraries leaflets such as The Arts are Your Business, 
through the extension of such bodies as The Association for Business Sponsorship in the Arts 
(ABSA), and by the 1984 formation of the Business Sponsorship Incentive Scheme 
(BSIS).
xxviii
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An alternative model explicitly connecting cultural policy to consumer culture was produced 
by the Greater London Council, in which the agenda was to politicise mass cultural forms and 
develop pleasure, skills and social cohesion in local communities.
xxix
  Alongside the Greater 
London Enterprise Board, the GLC established community recording studios, non-
commercial video distribution in public libraries, and independent and radical book 
distribution co-ops and publishing houses.  This ‘progressive cultural industries approach’ 
emanated from the GLC’s Economic Policy Group rather than its Arts and Recreation 
Committee.  Producing reports and a major conference, Cultural Industries and Cultural 
Policy in London, the Economic Policy Group ‘showed how important the cultural sector is to 
London’s economy [and] concluded that public policy should treat the cultural sector as a co-
ordinated whole’.
xxx
  Whilst it was not, as Franco Bianchini  has pointed out, the most highly 
financed of the GLC’s cultural policies, it had significant impact as a new idea.  In a radical 
departure from the policy-making tradition of the left, it involved working through rather than 
against the market. 
 
Both of these projects linked explicit signifiers of consumer culture to cultural production in 
different ways.  Thatcherism dismantled the previous social democratic/liberal consensus to 
create policies which effectively extended a High Art discourse through – and into – wider 
corporate use, thereby compounding the undemocratic tendencies pre-existing within the state 
‘arts’ sector.  The GLC enabled co-operative community groups and organisations to deploy 
technologies more readily associated with mass production and consumption in order to 
develop useful skills and redistribute cultural power.  It attempted to fashion alternative 
cultural markets. 
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The very enthusiasm of the DCMS for the cultural industries has been a key part of its new 
identity. Like the old GLC activities it attempts to influence the sites producing cultural 
products or services, but unlike those practices, it has tended not to do this for an end goal of 
cultural democracy or community integration.  At one moment in New Labour’s pre-history, 
attention was actually given to this type of cultural politics. In 1986 Geoff Mulgan and Ken 
Worpole published their Saturday Night or Sunday Morning?, a book doubling as a historical 
excavation of left cultural policies and polemical manifesto, urging Labour to adopt more of 
the culturally populist strategies of the GLC.
xxxi
  Now the senior figure at the No. 10 Policy 
Unit, however, Mulgan seems to have done little to prevent the wholesale marginalisation of 
this agenda. 
 
Instead, the cultural policies and affiliations of New Labour draw significantly from those 
established under Thatcherism in their emphasis on economic growth or profit. The rhetoric 
of individualistic Romanticism is entirely compatible with Thatcherite entrepreneurialism, 
and the renaming and widening of the remit of the Department of Heritage now looks least as 
much due to the governmental ‘recognition’ of the economic potential of the cultural 
industries as to an anti-elitist agenda.  It is noticeable that the only ‘shape-up’ speech in 
Creative Britain is delivered to libraries.  Indeed the sponsorship initiatives of the Thatcher 
years are not merely praised but encouraged and extended into an approach which asks not 
merely what business can do for the arts, but what the arts can do for business: 
  
The growth of business sponsorship has not just brought in useful cash, but expertise 
and experience too. This is now changing – and rightly so – into a two-way process. It 
has become clear that we also need to look at the benefits the creative approaches of the 
arts can in turn bring to business. Increasingly, the qualities demanded for business – 
such as communication skills, flexibility of approach, improvisational and creative 
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thinking, working as a team so that the parts add up to a whole – are precisely those that 
can be inculcated through exposure to the arts.
xxxii
  
 
This goes beyond even the arts-meets-business policies established under Thatcher, taking the 
insights of the GLC cultural industries projects and deploying them according to an agenda 
which begins and ends with the pursuit of profit.  This idea that ‘the arts’ can bring 
‘creativity’ to business intersects with the perceived ‘feminisation’ of industry and with 
attempts to integrate signifiers of leisure into certain types of ‘flexecutive’ workplaces, as 
well as with the new-age discourse of holism in contemporary business practice that Karen 
Salamon explores elsewhere in this volume.  It is also a key term for New Labour anti-
politics; as Liz Greenhalgh astutely points out, in Blairite discourse, ‘creativity is positive, 
light, the essential human spirit, boundless and free, whilst ‘ideology’ is the old 
repressor’.
xxxiii
  In a similar vein, the asinine and ubiquitous phrase ‘excellence’ springs from 
the pages of 1980s management theory, particularly a book by Thomas Peters and Robert 
Waterman, In Search of Excellence: Lessons from America’s Best-Run companies. As the 
self-help manual of radical democratic organisations, What a Way to Run a Railroad, 
commented as far back as 1985, it ‘has seemed recently to be the fate of Excellence to be 
championed by the mediocre in the interests of the worst’.
xxxiv
  
 
New Labour and the Sensation Generation 
I want to turn now to looking at New Labour’s cultural affiliations in a more discursive sense 
by examining the politics of that much-discussed exhibition of 1997, Sensation: Young 
British Artists From the Saatchi Collection. Staged in the Royal Academy, traditionally the 
most ‘Middle England’ of metropolitan art institutions,
xxxv
 Sensation was easily able to 
bounce off the reflected dullness of the Academy’s reputation to fashion and hone its avant-
garde credentials.  Indeed, this was necessary for both the display and for the institution.  The 
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main trope of both the exhibition’s promotion and the media coverage it generated was that of 
the ‘shock aesthetics’ of its pieces, pieces including Marcus Harvey’s image of Myra Hindley, 
Myra, Damien Hirst’s stuffed shark, and Jake and Dinos Chapman’s sculptures of children 
with penis-sprouting foreheads.  Staging this event was guaranteed to alienate a segment 
(enough, but not too much) of the Royal Academy’s steady audience and The Daily Mail; and 
simultaneously, and for exactly the same reason, it was guaranteed to expand vastly the host 
institution’s promotional power.  It worked, becoming the most profitable exhibition of the 
year, rescuing the supposedly ailing Academy from a considerable proportion of its debts.  
 
The New Labour government lent enthusiastic support to the project. Tony Blair announced 
that a work by the artist Mark Francis, similar to his piece in Sensation, was to appear on his 
walls in Downing Street. ‘He may’ suggested a spokesman, ‘use his office to promote works 
by British artists that are proving an international success’.
xxxvi
  In Creative Britain Chris 
Smith praises Sensation sculptor Rachel Whiteread (most famous for producing House, a 
temporary concrete cast of the interior of a terraced house in Bow) and refers to Damien Hirst 
as a good example of one of the ‘skilled, creative people’ that are, for him, reinvigorating 
Britain’s cultural economy.
xxxvii
 A Hirst painting even adorns the book’s dust-jacket.  
 
In several respects the government’s endorsement of the Sensation generation was very easy 
to read.  A publicity-seeking exhibition which hyped its ‘youthful’ identity, the ‘BritArt’ of 
Sensation was being heavily promoted by its network of vested interests as a ready and 
available signifier of national renewal.  For the government, association with this helped to 
consolidate and amplify its keywords of new, youth and nation in that particular post-election 
moment.  But exactly what set of values and interests were being promoted here?  To 
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understand what was at stake in this we can take a closer look at the cultural politics of the 
exhibition and its intersection with wider discursive formations.  
 
Shark Aesthetics 
Given that the artworks in Sensation were very visibly the property of Charles Saatchi, 
synonymous in British political culture with advertising (as co-founder of Saatchi & Saatchi) 
as well as with Thatcherism (Saatchi & Saatchi helped the 1979 election victory with their 
‘Labour Isn’t Working’ campaign), it is appropriate to consider further the discursive 
connections between the exhibition and the world of advertising.  
 
A key cultural corollary of the exhibition lies in the ‘shock’ advertising techniques beloved of 
certain practitioners of second-wave advertising.  Focusing on more closely defined niche-
markets, ‘second-wave’ advertising marked its difference from previous advertising 
techniques by not so much dwelling on a product’s unique selling point in adverts as 
marketing it through association with lifestyle aesthetics and cinematic or innovative visual 
effects.  The clothing company Benetton became the arch example of a company using these 
shock techniques: shifting its advertising strategy in 1991 from one of multi-sweatered 
multiculturalism, its creative director and photographer Oliviero Toscani began to use a 
campaign based around controversial photographs, including images of a nun kissing a priest, 
a new-born baby covered in blood, a man who had been shot, black and white hands in 
handcuffs, and, perhaps most notoriously, an image of a man dying from AIDS.  
 
The Benetton campaign interpellated two main consumer subjectivities: the media-savvy 
consumer, tired of conventional product advertising; and a socially aware consumer who 
might be counted on to appreciate the company’s ‘honesty’ in displaying iconic images of 
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contemporary suffering.  As Carol Squires puts it, the campaign indicated that ‘denial in the 
service of upbeat consumerism is no longer a workable strategy as we are continually 
overwhelmed by disturbing and even cataclysmic events’.
xxxviii
  Benetton extended this into a 
moral justification, stressing that it was being socially responsible by presenting the ‘realities 
of contemporary society’, and the argument that it enabled images of cultural and political 
tragedy and oppression to be widely circulated gained the campaign high profile supporters 
such as Spike Lee.  The campaign also addressed a section of the media who, successfully 
shocked, would seize on its controversial new strategies as newsworthy, thereby providing 
free publicity and boosting Benetton’s brand awareness.
xxxix
  The discourse at work was one 
of shock aesthetics delivering a shot of necessary truths to its consumer constituency. In short, 
it offered a type of sensational, avant-garde realism. 
 
We can see how this discourse worked its way through to the contemporary images 
constructed around an aesthetic of shock in Sensation.  In Henry Giroux’s critique of the 
Benetton campaign’s cultural aesthetics, he writes that they offer ‘a type of “hyperventilating” 
realism (a realism of sensationalism, shock, horror and spectacle)’ in which ‘they are stripped 
of their political possibilities and reduced to a spectacle of fascination, horror and terror that 
appears to privatise one’s response to events’.
xl
  It would not be far-fetched to say the same of 
Myra.  Whilst Sensation differed on certain grounds (dwelling more on the attempt to upset 
what it imagined to be bourgeois sensibilities, and less on manipulating liberal sensibilities) it 
shared much of the same agenda.   Both Benetton’s advertising strategies and Sensation 
participated in a shared discursive formation of privatised immobility and an ethics of 
superior distance.  For example, within the exhibition’s promotional frame, Richard 
Billingham’s photographs of his working-class family are rendered as an anthropological 
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encounter, a curiosity validated through the viewpoint of an ‘insider’.  It is worth noting that 
there is no democracy of the gaze in the photographs; nothing is reciprocated.
xli
  
 
Labour’s implicit or explicit support for the Sensation generation continued that of the 
Conservatives; Chris Smith’s predecessor, Virginia Bottomley, had praised Damien Hirst’s 
work on the grounds that ‘All art is meant to disturb’.
xlii
  The work was validated through the 
discourse that the function of art is to display and reveal unpalatable and necessary truths. 
What was being legitimated and reinscribed by both Bottomley and Smith’s support, then, 
was the notion of the importance of an avant-garde.  
 
Labour, however, became identified as sympathetic to this cultural formation to a degree way 
beyond that implied by Bottomley’s taut message of approval.  In doing so it legitimated a 
second key feature of Sensation, that of its populism: the exhibition was in part supported 
simply because of the breadth and volume of its coverage, because of its discursive reach.  In 
an unprecedented move, the London listings magazine Time Out –one of the exhibition’s 
sponsors – offered its version of a Sensation catalogue as a pull-out supplement. The 
exhibition also had a symbiotic relationship with the tabloid press: the dealer of the majority 
of the artists tipped off The Sun about its potentially offensive content, and in return The Sun 
gave the exhibition a barrage of scandalised coverage; as one commentator put it, 
‘contemporary art has grown both popular and deliciously weird from the tabloid’s point of 
view’.
xliii
  Going out of its way to disseminate an avant-garde discourse to a wider audience, 
the exhibition’s visual jokes or concepts (Damien Hirst’s shark, Sarah Lucas’s kebab 
representing a vagina on a table-top) were easily accessible, not demanding the usual amount 
of cultural capital of its audience; the exhibition, as Angela McRobbie has pointed out, ‘self-
consciously staged itself as shocking but was also completely unintimidating’.
xliv
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But at the same time Sensation referred to little beyond its own shocking puns: there was little 
if any engagement with social issues, and an almost complete disregard for the cultural 
politics or histories of its subjects.  The exception, out of this exhibition of work by forty-two 
artists, was Yinka Shonibare’s post-colonial reworking of Victoriana, and while we might cite 
some artists’ later output for evidence of more political engagement (such as Chris Ofili’s 
painting about Stephen Lawrence’s murder, No Woman, No Cry), it is important not to lose 
sight of the fact that it was the identity and branding of the exhibition which was influential. 
Here, as with the Benetton campaign, the ‘necessary truths’ it delivered were largely context-
free.  As Carol Squires has memorably pointed out, Benetton’s uncaptioned images of social 
breakdown were reduced to icons of universalised contemporary tragedy, images pointing not 
towards understanding of their social and political context but to a privatised immobility to be 
participated in by a social group for which buying clothes is both signifier and consolation.
xlv
  
The Benetton campaign offered a kind of immobilising pessimism, smug in its apparently 
alienated knowledge, disabling to any kind of agency for positive change.  It is no coincidence 
that Benetton is often invoked as a neo-liberal post-Fordist company which has kept its 
overheads down by employing large amounts of poorly paid female subcontractors, and that 
company head Luciano Benetton has doubled as right-wing senator in the Italian Parliament, 
vigorously promoting policies of deregulation of the marketplace and limiting state 
intervention.
xlvi
  The advertising discourse of privatised immobility is not accidental.   
 
Likewise, Sensation marked a new use being found for contemporary visual arts; it functioned 
as a tool which 
  
can now be relied upon to deliver particular audiences, broadly speaking the social 
categories AB and C1, and more specifically, the design and style-conscious young 
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opinion-formers. The problem for businesses trying to reach these influential but 
marketing-literate categories of consumers is that they do not respond favourably to 
conventional advertising and marketing techniques.
xlvii
 
 
In these terms, in its attempt to reach what Bourdieu calls ‘new cultural intermediaries’, the 
exhibition functioned as a type of conventionally delineated advertising, only with a displaced 
identity, all the more effective for its concealed status. In this sense, Sensation  inversely 
paralleled adverts like Benetton’s attempts to claim the status of art.  Just as ‘art’ adverts 
make little reference to the products they purport to advertise, the Sensation exhibits made no 
reference to the social world which avant-garde art purports to critique.  The promotional 
network surrounding and constituting the exhibition meant that Sensation was a moment of 
synergistic marketing between those with vested interests in it, particularly Charles Saatchi, 
the YBAs, Christies, the Royal Academy and Time Out.  This is not to say that there is 
anything wrong with marketing per se – it can be used, amongst other things, to market 
democratic ideas – merely that what was being marketed in this case was a politically 
conservative discourse, one which simultaneously swelled the ever-expanding wallet of 
Charles Saatchi and friends. 
 
The Ken Sensation 
But if the YBAs are so apolitical, in contrast to the offerings of the GLC’s cultural policies, 
then what were they doing in the spring of 2000 explicitly supporting Ken Livingstone in his 
campaign to become mayor of London?
xlviii
  Is this not contradictory?  Firstly, I would suggest 
that it was indicative of the politics of location: the YBAs displayed their identification with 
the metropolis in order to maintain an image of urban bohemianism.  Secondly, the event of 
the Mayoral election itself was perceived as ‘less political’, offering minimal significant 
power, alongside the endorsement of ‘personality politics’ through the appointment of a ‘face’ 
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for London.  And thirdly, Livingstone enlisted their support because he was seen to offer an 
alternative to party politics.  In one sense this is not a bad thing, since it demonstrated the 
enduring legacy of the GLC in reaching new constituencies of support and mobilising 
enthusiasm for a progressive agenda – an ability to reach parts that political parties failed to 
reach.  On the other hand, the alignment of the YBAs with Livingstone occurred precisely 
because he was seen to be a ‘rebel’ against ‘the system’; in short, it is an avant-garde politics 
of critiquing without participating. 
 
However, and more worryingly, in terms of the policies of New Labour  – or more 
encouragingly, should we chose to look at it in terms of the political ‘maturity’ of the YBAs – 
in one selective sense this critique is right: it rails against the rigid authoritarianism and 
managerialism offered by New Labour.  Despite the affection of both for corporate cool, the 
libertarian ethos of the YBAs clashes with the authoritarianism of Labour’s agenda.  The 
mismatch between these discourses was one reason why ‘Cool Britannia’ looked so ridiculous 
so quickly.
xlix
  
 
The unique selling point of Sensation, as many commentators have pointed out, was its 
perceived status as BritArt
TM
:
l
 a symbol of the current ‘state’ of both British cultural practice 
and the new political culture.  It was recognisably part of the same cultural formation as 
Creative Britain and Mark Leonard’s Rebranding Britain report for the DEMOS think tank, 
thereby adding to its newsworthy appeal for the broadsheets.
li
  Just as the exhibition promoted 
the ‘mediators, brokers and diversifiers’ of the Sensation generation, so has the keynote of the 
DCMS been to promote the popular-and-profitable, and so too has the mantra of Creative 
Britain been that ‘the arts’ are a resource to be exploited.  
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From ‘House’ to Powerhouse 
Culture and the State identified the emergence of a distinct mode of ‘Culture’ as coeval with 
the emergence of the representative modern state, with its more repressive, and exclusionary 
aspects.  These legacies are apparent in New Labour’s discourse in several ways.  
 
Firstly, the liberal discourse of ‘Culture’ as constituting the understanding of works of 
creativity and genius – a discourse which was deployed to separate the ‘civilised’ from the 
‘uncivilised’ – still has its place in New Labour’s understanding of culture.  This discourse of 
culture as the ‘fully human’ is now, however, primarily deployed not as a means of social 
division but in order to assist the accumulation of corporate capital.  New Labour’s cultural 
field has been licensed to expand by virtue of its capacity to deliver economic profit: at the 
heart of this definition of culture is an equation in which ‘culture’ can now only qualify as 
‘culture’ if it is corporate – priorities which fit snugly into a wider governmental agenda that 
Anthony Barnett has termed corporate populism.
lii
 
 
The deference towards corporations, and the acceptance and encouragement of the global 
economy as a force of nature, is New Labour’s primary point of orientation, as a quick glance 
around the Millennium Dome – a showcase for assorted businesses and a material polemic in 
favour of ‘flexible specialisation’ – will reveal.  Whilst the function of the nation state is now 
clearly very different from the 1950s, we might compare the Dome with the enormously 
popular 1951 Festival of Britain, which also had a trade function: sections of the South Bank 
exhibition were designed to improve the sales and image of British goods.  The key difference 
between the Festival and the Dome, however, was that, firstly, in 1951, there was 
considerable government anxiety and direct intervention about the potential partisan 
promotion of products; secondly, commercial exhibitors were limited to a small element of 
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the total display space; and thirdly, companies did not ‘display themselves’ – they did not 
have the governing principle and representational power over the exhibits. Rather than the 
individual companies autonomously bonding together to represent a fragmented commercial 
nation – which in some ways is exactly what the Dome does – it was for ‘the nation’ to decide 
how the individual companies were represented.
liii
  
 
In effect, the Dome formed what was rendered with a curious literalism at the Department of 
Trade and Industry’s temporary showcase for British creative industries, the 1998 
powerhouse::uk exhibition.  Illustrating the theme ‘Communicating’ was a room-sized model 
of London made from a one-stop shop at Sainsburys.  The miniature commodity-city was 
entirely constructed from branded goods – almost a sanitised, comic version of an anti-
consumerist dystopia, complete with a baked-bean tin version of Battersea power station, in 
order to illustrate ‘the city as a canvas for creativity as well as for inspiration’.
liv
  The 
exhibition was slightly more interesting and progressive than the Dome in its use of 
innovative display techniques, ergonomic designs, green solutions, and even a co-operative 
advertising firm, but the authoritarian discourse of facilitating corporate success remained. 
 
The second point I have extrapolated from Lloyd and Thomas’s analysis is how ‘culture’ 
became deployed as a separate sphere distinct from work.  Under Blairism it would appear 
that we have the exact opposite of this, as the promotion of the term ‘the cultural industries’ – 
alongside the incorporation of signifiers of leisure and ‘creativity’ into certain strands of the 
workplace – illustrates.  However, paradoxically, what remains is the discourse of culture and 
creativity as a quality which is both individual and distinct from that of wider social life. 
Consequently, there is little or no sense that the objects and aesthetics being promoted have a 
politics which connects to them.  This, of course, is directly the opposite of the project 
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pursued by cultural studies, which – in a genealogy we might trace in particular through the 
works of Williams and Bourdieu – took the expression ‘there’s no accounting for taste’ and 
turned it on its head.  There was every possibility of accounting for taste, and the importance 
of doing so was a critical and political necessity.  Such insights, which appeared to be gaining 
ground in an earlier moment of Labour’s cultural policies, have been explicitly marginalised. 
 
Culture and the State also points to how ‘Culture’ became used as an authoritarian mechanism 
paralleling the rise of representative democracy in its structure of speaking to rather than 
amongst people, and marginalising Chartist calls for cultural activities which could be 
produced from, be integrated into and be relevant for daily life experience.  Here we might 
cite that exhibition with its structure of self-absorbed statements, Sensation, which the 
government was so keen to promote, and Labour’s constant addresses to ‘the people’.  Liz 
Greenhalgh, commenting on the frequency with which Blair has ‘bolted the phrase “the 
people’s” onto projects and princesses’, has noticed that alongside the more egalitarian 
impulses inherent in the phrase, there also lurks a claim to represent the people reminiscent of 
Thatcher’s authoritarian populism.
lv
  To apply the insights of Lloyd and Thomas, we can see 
in Labour the attempt to form a culture which is representative rather than participative.  
While its cultural rhetoric addresses ‘the many rather than the few’, New Labour promotes 
cultural forms which are authoritarian, rather than policies and discourses which are 
democratic in terms of participation and access.  At present, ‘culture’ and ‘creativity’ mean 
little more than entrepreneurial brio inflected with some of the repressive seriousness of high 
art, a discourse more dependent on creative accounting than on an activated desire for 
democracy.  
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